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Abstract 
This study assesses whether improving governance standards affects environmental quality in 
44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2012. The empirical evidence is based 
on Generalised Method of Moments. Bundled and unbundled governance dynamics are used 
notably: (i) political governance (consisting of political stability and   “voice & 
accountability”); (ii) economic governance (entailing government effectiveness and regulation 
quality), (iii) institutional governance (represented by the rule of law and corruption-control) 
and (iv) general governance (encompassing political, economic and institutional governance 
dynamics). The following hypotheses are tested: (i) Hypothesis 1 (Improving political 
governance is negatively related to CO2 emissions); (ii) Hypothesis 2 (Increasing economic 
governance is negatively related to CO2 emissions) and (iii) Hypothesis 3 (Enhancing 
institutional governance is negatively related to CO2 emissions. Results of the tested 
hypotheses show that: the validity of Hypothesis 3 cannot be determined based on the results; 
Hypothesis 2 is not valid while Hypothesis 1 is partially not valid. The main policy 
implication is that governance standards need to be further improved in order for government 
quality to generate the expected unfavorable effects on CO2 emissions. 
 
Keywords: CO2 emissions; Governance; Economic development; Sustainable development; 
Africa 
JEL Classification: C52; O38; O40; O55; P37  
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1. Introduction 
 Assessing how improving governance is relevant to Africa’s development is motivated 
by three main factors, namely: (i) the contemporary concern related to the pollution of the 
environment; (ii) poor governance issues connected with the management of the policy 
syndrome of environmental pollution2 and (iii) gaps in the scholarly literature. The factors are 
expanded chronologically in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 First, compared to the past decades, the concern of engaging economic and household 
activities within an environment that is sustainable is more apparent in the post-2015 
development agenda because sustainability of the environment is central to the achievement 
of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The importance of environmental sustainability 
which is consistent with contemporary literature is premised on two paramount factors 
(Akpan et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2016; Mbah and Nzeadibe, 2016; Asongu et al., 2017), 
notably, the: (i) appalling energy crisis in Africa and (ii) effects of global environmental 
pollution. On the one hand, consistent with Shurig (2015), Akinyemi et al. (2015) and Jarrett 
(2017), about 620 million inhabitants in Africa lack access to “affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern electricity”. This represents about two-thirds of the population in the 
continent. Moreover, the underlying crisis is relatively more prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) compared to North Africa (IRENA, 2010).  
 On the other hand, Kifle (2008), Huxster et al. (2015) and Asongu et al. (2017) have 
argued that the effects of green house gas emissions would be most nefarious in SSA. It is 
also worthwhile to articulate that the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) represent about three-
quarter of the global greenhouse gas emissions (Akpan and Akpan, 2012; Asongu et al., 
2018). Furthermore, in accordance with Jarrett (2017), a main impediment to entrepreneurship 
and doing business in Africa is the lack of power supply. The author further articulates that 
regular blackouts are experienced by about 30 countries and this predicament accounts for 
between 2 to 5% loss in annual gross domestic product (GDP). In the nutshell, the deficiency 
in energy across Africa is detrimental on a number of fronts, inter alia, in: job creation, health 
facilities, education, agricultural transformation and industrial prosperity. Among 
                                                 
2
 With regard to Fosu (2013), a policy syndrome denotes characteristics that are unfeasible for economic 
development, inter alia:   “administered redistribution”, “state breakdown”, “state controls”, and “suboptimal 
inter temporal resource allocation”. The underlying notion is understood by Asongu (2017) as a deficiency in 
knowledge economy while recent inclusive development literature (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2017a; Tchamyou 
et al., 2019a) conceive and define it as inequality and/or growth that is not broad-based. Within the context of 
this research, a policy syndrome is understood to represent environmental degradation.   
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recommendations to policy makers on the importance of environmental sustainability in 
achieving SDGs, Jarrett (2017) has emphasized that it is important for governments of 
concerned countries to enhance governance standards, with a particular focus on how 
government measures can be designed to improve shared economic development and easy 
access to affordable, reliable and clean energy.  The present research is consistent with the 
discussed policy insights and recommendations in that, it is focusing on how enhancing 
governance standards in SSA affect environmental pollution.  
 Second, SSA is characterized by some of the world’s worst energy grid systems and 
there is an apparent absence of political will to address the energy and environmental issues 
(Jarrett, 2017). Accordingly, the attendant literature is abundantly clear on the fact that 
environmental degradation in SSA is substantially traceable to the mismanagement of the 
environment and energy crisis. Notable studies in this strand include: Odhiambo (2010), 
Afful-Koomson (2012), Apkan and Akpan (2012),  Hongwu (2013), Jones (2003),  Chemutai 
(2009),  Odhiambo (2014a, 2014b), Anyangwe (2014), Akinyemi et al. (2015, 2019), Jarrett 
(2017), Asongu (2018a), Asongu et al. (2018), Efobi et al. (2019)  and Asongu and Odhiambo 
(2019a, 2020a, 2020b). Unfortunately, the highlighted literature, inter alia, has failed to 
assess how improving governance standards affects environmental pollution in the sub-region.  
 Third, the highlighted gap in the literature builds on the fact that the bulk of attendant 
studies has largely focused on linkages between environmental pollution, the consumption of 
energy and economic prosperity. The extant knowledge can be summarized in two main 
categories. The first which focuses on the linkage between economic growth and 
environmental pollution is concerned with investigating the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC) hypothesis3. Some research in this strand include: Diao et al. (2009), Akbostanci et al. 
(2009) and He and Richard (2010). The second category has two principal dimensions, 
notably: (i) linkages between energy consumption and the pollution of the environment with 
some interesting studies from Jumbe (2004), Ang (2007), Apergis and Payne (2009), 
Odhiambo (2009a, 2009b), Ozturk and Acaravci (2010),  Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2010), 
Bölük and Mehmet (2015) and Begum et al. (2015)  and (ii) nexuses between economic 
development and needs in energy for production processes in households and corporations, 
with studies from Mehrara (2007) and Esso (2010)4.  
                                                 
3
 “The EKC hypothesis is the position that in the long term, there is an inverted U-shape nexus between per 
capita income and environmental degradation. 
4
 “Also see Akinlo (2008) and Olusegun (2008)”.  
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We are cognizant of the risks associated with an empirical exercise that is not 
supported by clear theoretical underpinnings. However, we argue that an empirical 
investigation based on policy insights and logical intuition is a useful scientific activity, 
especially in the light of contemporary development challenges such as environmental 
sustainability. The intuition for nexuses between governance dynamics and environmental 
standards are discussed in Section 2. Hence, this research is consistent with the attendant 
literature supporting the perspective that applied econometrics could be relevant for theory-
building and should not be exclusively restricted to the acceptance and rejection of existing 
theoretical underpinnings (Narayan et al., 2011;  Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016a). 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the testable 
hypotheses in the light of linkages between governance and CO2 emissions. Section 3 presents 
the data and discusses the methodology. Section 4 discloses and discusses the results while 
Section 5 concludes with implications and future research directions.   
 
2. Linkages between governance and CO2 emissions: hypotheses development  
This section develops the arguments supporting the testable hypotheses on nexuses between 
governance and CO2 emissions. Consistent with Chemutai (2009), the governance challenges 
are related to an evolving number of issues in Africa that are connected with among others: 
food insecurity, economic resources that are inequitably distributed, the scarcity of water, loss 
of land that is arable, poverty and environmental degradation. The governance issues 
surrounding environmental mismanagement are apparent because many African nations are 
severely strained by the underpinning concerns because of among others: the shortage of 
capacity required to take on board changes resulting from improved international community 
standards.  
 As argued by Chemutai (2009), environmental governance policies in Africa need to 
be considerably overhauled in the light of mainstream standards of environmental protection. 
Whereas the author has further  presented a case for the importance for developed countries in 
helping those in Africa to improve environmental governance, this research builds on the 
recommendation to assess how improving governance standards affects the degradation of the 
environment in SSA.   
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 According to Jones (2003) and Chemutai (2009), given the apparent concerns about 
governance, African countries have not found it easy to put in place Agenda 215. Furthermore, 
the implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) across the continent 
has not also been smooth. The documented policy and institutional challenges that generate 
structures which are inefficient include: the lack of appropriate expertise, shortage of 
equipments, absence of finance and instruments with which trade policies, corporate 
unaccountability, environmental protection, international law, inter alia, can be enforced.  In 
line with the narrative, for a plethora of motives, environmental policies and standards (e.g. 
more rigid business accountability policies) are linked with concerns of environmental 
pollution.  
 Given the above, environmental issues can be tackled if countries ameliorate their 
standards in environmental governance. Therefore, tackling apparent weaknesses and 
constraints in the environmental institutions of the continent is policy-relevant in the post-
2015 development agenda. Effective legislation, improved transparency, security and peace, 
political stability and robustness in procedures of environmental management are crucial for 
CO2 emissions to be reduced sustainably across Africa. The concern can be tackled with 
improved institutional, economic and political channels or instruments. The conception and 
definition of governance measures adopted within the framework of this study are in line with 
Andrés et al. (2015) who have built on six governance indicators from the World Governance 
Indicators of the World Bank.  In view of the attendant literature: “(i) political governance 
(measured with political stability/no violence and  “voice & accountability”) is the election 
and replacement of political leaders;  (ii) economic governance (entailing government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) is the formulation and implementation of policies that 
deliver public goods and services and (iii) institutional governance (proxied by corruption-
control and the rule of law) is the respect of citizens and the State, of institutions that govern 
interactions between them”.   
 Building on the discussed intuition, the testable hypotheses underpinning this research 
are substantiated in what follows. First, with regard to the prism of political governance, the 
capacity of the government to prevent environmental degradation can be substantially 
curtailed by the possibility that elected leaders can be overthrown and governments 
                                                 
5
 “Agenda 21 is a United Nation’s voluntarily implemented plan of action that is non-binding with respect to 
sustainable development”. 
7 
 
destabilized by unconstitutional and violent mechanisms. The underlying discourse pertains to 
the political governance perspective of political stability/no violence. From the angle of 
“voice and accountability”, the ability of the government to put in place measures for 
effective environmental management can also be constrained by the degree at which citizens 
of a nation can: (i) effectively participate in the government’s selection process and (ii) reap 
the fruits of free media, freedoms of association and liberty of expression.  The following 
hypothesis can be derived from the narrative on political governance.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Enhancing political governance is negatively related to CO2 emissions.  
 
Second, as concerns the dimension of economic governance, the pollution of the environment 
is very likely to be influenced by the effectiveness of the government in implementing 
policies that are designed to protect the environment, especially in terms of the government’s 
credibility in the formulation and implementation of such policies. Moreover, credible 
regulation quality is also essential given that with regard to environmental protection, it 
positively affects the government’s ability in: (i) effectively articulating sound measures; (ii) 
communicating effectively on guidelines and (iii) enforcing rules that enable and foster the 
development of the private sector. The following hypothesis can be derived from the narrative 
on economic governance.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Increasing economic governance is negatively related to CO2 emissions.  
 
Third, from the institutional angle, it is also feasible to argue that institutional governance can 
affect the effectiveness of the government in implementing measures of environmental 
protection. This can be evident, contingent on the degree by which: (i) agents abide by and are 
confident in the rules of society and especially with regard to property rights, contract 
enforcement, the courts, the police as well as the possibility of violence and crimes (i.e. the 
rule of law) and (ii) public power is diverted for private interest, including grand forms of 
corruption, petty thievery and elite capture of the state. The following hypothesis can be 
inferred from the narrative on institutional governance.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Improving institutional governance is negatively related to CO2 emissions.  
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The present research focuses on 44 SSA nations using data for the period 2000-20126. The 
data come from two principal sources, notably: (i) World Governance Indicators of the World 
Bank for the six governance variables and (ii) World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank for the CO2 emissions indicator and the control variables.  The geographical and 
temporal scopes of the study are motivated by data availability constraints at the time the 
study.   
 The main outcome variable is CO2 emissions per capita, in accordance with 
contemporary environmental pollution literature (Asongu, 2018b). The governance indicators 
from Kaufmann et al. (2010) include: political stability/no violence, voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, the rule of law and corruption-control. These 
exhaustive governance indicators are increasingly being used in the African governance 
literature. Some recent studies within this framework include: Andres et al. (2015), Efobi 
(2015), Oluwatobi et al. (2015), Ajide and Raheem, (2016a, 2016b) and Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2017b).  With respect to the attendant literature:   “The first concept is about the 
process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (Political Governance): voice 
and accountability and political stability. The second has to do with the capacity of 
government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic 
Governance): regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no means 
least, regards the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions 
among them (Institutional Governance): rule of law and control of corruption” (Andres et al., 
2015:1041). 
 Building on recent CO2 emission literature (Asongu, 2018b), three main control 
variables are adopted for the study, namely: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, 
population growth and education quality. All these variables are expected to positively affect 
the outcome variable. On the one hand, the anticipated effects from economic prosperity and 
population growth are logical in the light of the fact that economic development is associated 
with activities that emit green house gases. Additionally, more people are also expected to 
                                                 
6
 The 44 countries are: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic. Republic., Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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contribute more towards CO2 emissions in society. On the other hand, the conception and 
definition of education quality is in terms of the pupil-teacher ratio. Hence, an increasing ratio 
translates poor education quality because more people are accommodated by less teaching 
staff. The choice of primary education quality, relative to variables from higher education 
quality is motivated by two factors: (i) data availability constraints on variables from higher 
levels of learning and (ii) the documented comparative importance of primary education when 
countries are experiencing initial levels of industrialisation. These studies include: Petrakis 
and Stamakis (2002), Asiedu (2014) and Asongu and Odhiambo (2019b).  
The restriction of the research to three control variables is because of the need to avoid 
instrument proliferation. The use of less control variables in the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) is not inconsistent with recent literature which has used limited variables in 
the conditioning information set, notably: no control variable (Osabuohien and Efobi, 2013; 
Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2017c) and two control variables (Bruno et al., 2012). Appendix 1 
provides the definitions and sources of variables; Appendix 2 discloses the summary statistics 
while the correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 GMM: Specification, identification and exclusion restrictions  
Following contemporary literature, the choice of the estimation technique is tailored to be 
consistent with the data behavior (Kou et al., 2012, 2014, 2016, 2019a, 2019b; Li et al., 2014, 
2016; Zhang et al., 2019). The GMM estimation strategy is premised on four foundations as 
documented in contemporary literature (Tchamyou, 2019, 2020). First and foremost, the 
number of cross sections being examined substantially exceeds the corresponding periods in 
each cross section because the research is focusing on 44 countries for 13 years (i.e. 2000-
2012). Second, the CO2 emissions variable is persistent in the light of the fact that the 
correlation between level and first lag values is higher than the established threshold of 0.800, 
which is the documented rule of thumb for appreciating persistence in a variable (Tchamyou 
et al., 2019a, 2019b; Meniago and Asongu, 2018).  Third, in the light of the panel data 
structure, cross-country variations are taken on board in the empirical exercise. Fourth, the 
empirical exercise is also designed to tackle the issue of endogeneity by accounting for: (i) the 
unobserved heterogeneity by means of time invariant variables and (ii) reverse causality or 
simultaneity with a process of instrumentation.   
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 Cognizant of developments in the application of the GMM strategy, the Arellano and 
Bover (1995) extension of Roodman (2009a, 2009b) is adopted because it has been 
established in recent literature to reduce the proliferation of instruments (Asongu and 
Nwachukwu, 2016b; Boateng et al., 2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019a).   
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
tititih
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where, tiCO ,
 
is the CO2 emissions variable of  country i
 
in  period t , 0  is a constant, 1  is 
the parameter corresponding to CO2 emissions,
 
G  entails governance   (political stability, 
voice & accountability, government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law and 
corruption-control),
 2
  is the parameter corresponding to governance, 
 
GG  denotes a 
quadratic interaction between governance dynamics (“political stability” × “political 
stability”, “voice & accountability” × “voice & accountability”, “government effectiveness” × 
“government effectiveness”, “regulation quality” × “regulation quality”, “corruption-control” 
× “corruption-control” and   “rule of law” × “rule of law”),
 3
  is the parameter corresponding 
to the quadratic interaction between governance dynamics, W  is the vector of control 
variables (GDP growth, population growth and education quality),
 h
  denotes parameters 
corresponding to three control variables adopted in the conditioning information set and by 
implication h  varies from 1 to 3 (i.e. 1 for GDP growth, 2  for population growth and 3 for 
education),
 

 
represents the coefficient of auto-regression which is one within the framework 
of this study because a year lag is enough to capture past information, t
 
is the time-specific 
constant,
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  is the error term.  
 
3.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 The discourse on identification and exclusion restrictions is paramount for robust 
system GMM estimation. The identification and exclusion restrictions approach adopted in 
this research is consistent with recent applications of the GMM empirical strategy. These 
studies include, inter alia: Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016c), Tchamyou and Asongu (2017),  
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Tchamyou (2019, 2020),  Boateng et al. (2018), Meniago and Asongu (2018) and Tchamyou 
et al. (2019b). According to the identification strategy, strictly exogenous variables are 
considered as time invariant variables whereas the endogenous explaining variables are 
acknowledged to be predetermined. Roodman (2009b) supports this identification and 
exclusion restriction approach in the perspective that it is not practical for the adopted strictly 
exogenous variables to be endogenous after a first difference7.   
 Given the discussed identification framework, the exclusion restriction assumption is 
validated when the alternative hypothesis pertaining to the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) 
for instrument exogeneity is rejected. This alternative hypothesis supports the view that the 
defined strictly exogenous variables affect the dependent variable beyond the engaged 
predetermined channels. This procedure is consistent with a classical instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation approach in which the alternative hypothesis of the Sargan test is the position 
that the adopted instruments do not affect the outcome variable exclusively via the identified 
endogenous explaining mechanisms (Beck et al., 2003; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016d). 
 
4. Empirical results  
4. Presentation of results  
 Table 1 discloses the empirical results. They are presented in three principal 
categories, each corresponding to a governance dimension, notably: political governance 
(entailing political stability and voice & accountability); economic governance (consisting of 
government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional governance (encompassing 
the rule of law and corruption-control).  Four main information criteria are used to assess the 
post-estimation validity of the specifications8. Based on these criteria, all the models are 
overwhelmingly valid because they pass the corresponding post-estimation diagnostic tests.  
 In order to assess the overall incidence of improving governance on CO2 emissions, 
net effects are computed from the estimations.  For example, in the third column of Table 1, 
the net relationship of enhancing “voice & accountability” on CO2 emissions is 0.075 
(2×[0.124 × -0.543] + [0.210]). In the calculation of this net relationship, the mean value of 
                                                 
7
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
8
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu and De Moor, 
2017: 200). 
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“voice & accountability” is -0.543, the unconditional relationship of “voice & accountability” 
is 0.210 while the marginal relationship is 0.124. The leading 2 on the first term is from the 
differentiation of the quadratic term. With the same mode of calculation, in the fifth column 
of Table 1, the net relationship from enhancing government effectiveness is 0.020 (2×[-0.697 
× -0.063] + [-0.067]). In the calculation of this net relationship, the average of “government 
effectiveness” is -0.697, the unconditional relationship of “government effectiveness” is -
0.067 while the marginal relationship is -0.063. Accordingly, the leading 2 on the first term is 
from the differentiation of the quadratic term.  
The significant control variable does not have the expected sign. A reason for the 
negative nexus between population growth and CO2 emissions could be traceable to, inter 
alia: (i) population growth not associated with increasing levels of industrialization and 
productivity, as has been apparent in Africa since political independence in the 1960s and (ii)  
the fruits of economic prosperity not equitably distributed across the population such that 
poorer fractions have less to consume and by extension, contribute less towards green house 
gas emissions. While according to Morris and Fessehaie (2014), Africa’s contribution to 
world trade and global economic prosperity has substantially decreased since independence, 
recent literature on the poverty tragedy in Africa is consistent with the view that over the past 
two decades, the fruits of economic prosperity in SSA have not been equitably distributed 
across the population (Asongu and le Roux, 2017, 2019; Bicaba et al., 2017).   
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  Table 1: Enhancing governance and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Political Governance 
(Hypothesis 1) 
Economic Governance 
(Hypothesis 2) 
Institutional Governance 
(Hypothesis 3) 
    
 Political Voice & Regulation Government Rule of Corruption- 
 Stability Accountability Quality Effectiveness Law Control 
       
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.908*** 0.891*** 0.904*** 0.928*** 0.897*** 0.923*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability (PS) 0.036 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.286)      
Voice & Accountability (VA) --- 0.210** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.023)     
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- 0.321*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Government Effectiveness (GE) --- --- --- -0.067* --- --- 
    (0.082)   
Rule of Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.184*** --- 
     (0.002)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- -0.026 
      (0.261) 
PS ×PS 0.006 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.664)      
VA × VA --- 0.124*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.009)     
RQ × RQ --- --- 0.109*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
GE × GE --- --- --- -0.063* --- --- 
    (0.080)   
RL × RL --- --- --- --- 0.015 --- 
     (0.811)  
CC × CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.019 
      (0.682) 
GDP growth  -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0005 
 (0.599) (0.773) (0.884) (0.170) (0.741) (0.626) 
Population growth  -0.099*** -0.086*** -0.074*** -0.082*** -0.095*** -0.090*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education  0.0004 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 
 (0.733) (0.956) (0.851) (0.444) (0.529) (0.729) 
       
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net relationships na 0.0753 0.1893 0.0208 na na 
       
AR(1) (0.129) (0.129) (0.141) (0.127) (0.128) (0.129) 
AR(2) (0.165) (0.172) (0.168) (0.171) (0.167) (0.170) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.732) (0.502) (0.595) (0.193) (0.704) (0.634) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.021) (0.030) (0.128) (0.021) (0.035) (0.015) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.985) (0.830) (0.720) (0.470) (0.952) (0.974) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.112) (0.285) (0.188) (0.039) (0.217) (0.260) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.976) (0.583) (0.792) (0.578) ( 0.873) (0.761) 
       
Fisher  9541.20*** 2598.78*** 40909*** 19557.61*** 6043.67*** 24201.99*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 
       
“*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. The following are the mean values of governance variables: -0.486 (political stability); -
0.543 (voice & accountability); -0.697 (government effectiveness); -0.604 (regulation quality); -0.663 (rule of law) and -0.590 (corruption-
control). Constants are included in the regressions”.  
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4.2 Robustness checks  
 The research further investigates the validity of established findings in Table 1, by 
bundling the relevant governance variables through principal component analysis. This 
approach to reducing the dimensions of constituent elements in a governance category is 
consistent with contemporary studies on Africa’s development, notably: Tchamyou (2017) 
and Asongu and Odhiambo (2019c). The principal component analysis is such that: (i) 
political stability and voice & accountability are bundled to produce political governance; (ii) 
government effectiveness and regulation quality are reduced to economic governance and (iii) 
corruption-control and the rule of law are captured by institutional governance. In addition, a 
general governance composite indicator is also decomposed from the six governance 
dynamics.  
 From the information criteria used to assess the validity of models in Table 1, the 
models are overwhelmingly valid because they pass all post-estimation diagnostic tests. The 
results in Table 2 are consistent with those in Table 1 from three main perspectives. (i) Only 
estimates from regressions related to economic governance are relevant for the computation 
of nets relationships which are negative. (ii) Enhancing institutional governance does not 
significantly affect CO2 emissions, as apparent in the insignificance of its components in 
Table 1. (iii) Political governance is likely driven by political stability relative to “voice and 
accountability” because the insignificance of political governance in Table 2 is consistent 
with the corresponding insignificance in Table 1. By extension, general governance is driven 
by both political governance and institutional governance given that enhancing general 
governance does not significantly affect CO2 emissions. The narrative on the significant 
control variables is consistent with the discourse on corresponding estimates in Table 1.  
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Table 2: Robustness checks 
     
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
     
 Political  Economic  Institutional General  
 Governance  Governance  Governance  Governance  
 
(Hypothesis 1) (Hypothesis 2) (Hypothesis 3) 
 
     
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.896*** 0.904*** 0.916*** 0.913*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Governance (Polgov) 0.004 --- --- --- 
 (0.899)    
Economic Governance  (Ecogov) --- 0.077* --- --- 
  (0.052)   
Institutional Governance  (Instgov) --- --- 0.032 --- 
   (0.528)  
General Governance  (Ggov) --- --- --- 0.031 
    (0.396) 
Polgov × Polgov 0.007 --- --- --- 
 (0.689)    
Ecogov × Ecogov --- -0.023** --- --- 
  (0.049)   
Instgov × Instgov --- --- -0.020 --- 
   (0.205)  
Ggov × Ggov --- --- --- -0.010 
    (0.229) 
GDP growth  -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0001 
 (0.902) (0.122) (0.506) (0.900) 
Population growth  -0.102*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.092*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education  -0.0004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.833) (0.282) (0.330) (0.230) 
     
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Net relationships na 0.0675 na na 
     
AR(1) (0.134) (0.132) (0.128) (0.129) 
AR(2) (0.164) (0.165) (0.169) (0.169) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.608) (0.338) (0.815) (0.718) 
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group (0.046) (0.091) (0.031) (0.054) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.866) (0.479) (0.991) (0.925) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.233) (0.333) (0.319) (0.261) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.759) (0.349) (0.905) (0.849) 
     
Fisher  2961.38*** 25587.94*** 1977.27*** 7643.89*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 
Countries  43 43 43 43 
Observations  296 296 296 296 
     
“*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. The following are the mean values of governance variables: 0.140 (political governance); 
0.205 (economic governance); 0.144 (institutional governance) and 0.284 (general governance). Constants are included in the regressions”. 
 
 
5. Concluding implication and future research directions 
 
 This study assesses whether improving governance standards affects environmental 
quality in 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2012. The empirical 
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evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments. Bundled and unbundled governance 
dynamics are used notably: (i) political governance (consisting of political stability and   
“voice & accountability”); (ii) economic governance (entailing government effectiveness and 
regulation quality), (iii) institutional governance (represented by the rule of law and 
corruption-control) and (iv) general governance (encompassing political, economic and 
institutional governance dynamics). The following hypotheses are tested: (i) Hypothesis 1 
(Improving political governance is negatively related to CO2 emissions); (ii) Hypothesis 2 
(Increasing economic governance is negatively related to CO2 emissions) and (iii) Hypothesis 
3 (Enhancing institutional governance is negatively related to CO2 emissions.   
Results of the tested hypotheses show that: the validity of Hypothesis 3 cannot be 
determined based on the results; Hypothesis 2 is not valid while Hypothesis 1 is partially not 
valid. The main implication from the underlying findings is that governance standards need to 
be further improved in order for government quality to generate the expected unfavorable 
effects on CO2 emissions. The recommendation is also logical because governance standards 
are negatively skewed in the sampled countries (i.e. the standard range is -2.5 to +2.5). Hence, 
increasing a negative value is more likely to further increase a negative tendency.  
In what follows, governance-specific policy implications are discussed. First, as far as 
political governance is concerned, the corresponding implication is that conditions for the 
election and replacement of political leaders should be improved substantially. This can be 
done by, inter alia: (i) reducing incidences that can positively affect the likelihood of the 
governments of sampled countries to be overthrown through violent and unconstitutional 
mechanisms which may entail terrorism and violence and (ii) ameliorating the degree by 
which the citizens of countries take part in the selection of government officials as well as 
enjoy the freedom of association, expression and access to media.  
 Second, with respect to economic governance, considerable improvements are equally 
needed in the formulation and implementation of measures and mechanisms that deliver 
public commodities, which inter alia: can reduce CO2 emissions. For instance, availability of 
a good public transport system can substantially limit the emission of greenhouse gases. 
Hence, the government has to be more effective in the provision of public services that are of 
quality, limitation of political pressures on civil servants, quality of regulations, effective 
implementation of corresponding regulations and the relevance of credible governments in 
overseeing the implementation of underlying regulations. Moreover, such policies should also 
be tailored to favour competition in private sector development because such competition is 
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necessary to offer citizens with the best options for improving their livelihoods while at the 
same time reducing their carbon footprints.  
 Third, on the front of institutional governance, in order for both domestic and foreign 
stakeholders to have confidence in domestic institutions, both citizens and the governments of 
sampled countries should respect institutions that govern interactions between them, 
especially those pertaining to CO2 emissions. Hence, both citizens and the governments 
should be sanctioned in accordance with prescribed laws when they fail to respect rules and 
regulations designed to limit CO2 emissions. It follows that the rule of law and the control of 
corruption should be strongly upheld.  
It is important to note that the study is recommending that these governance measures 
should be substantially increased in the sub-region because the unexpected findings could be 
traceable to the inability of countries in SSA to gain from the time and level hypotheses 
related to the favourable effects of good governance which, have been independently tested to 
confirm the existence of a non-linear nexus between democracy and governance quality in 
developing countries (Sung, 2004; Asongu, 2014). Concerning the level of democracy 
hypothesis, it has been established that governance quality is highest in states where 
democracy is strong, average in authoritarian states and least in partly democratised states 
(Sung, 2004; Back & Hadenius, 2008; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016e). The time of exposure 
hypothesis maintains that young democracies have worse governance standards compared to 
authoritarian regimes, unlike old democracies which are associated with the best governance 
standards (Keefer, 2007). These level and time hypotheses are relevant to sub-Saharan Africa 
because democracies in the sub-region are young and the advent to multiparty politics began 
for the most part, only after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. It follows that with time, when 
governance standards are improved in the sub-region, they can be expected to increase 
environmental quality by means of decreasing CO2 emissions. Governments in sampled 
countries can fast-track the process by implementing the recommended policies pertaining 
political, economic and institutional governance.  
 Future studies should consider country-specific frameworks because the GMM 
approach is tailored to eliminate country-specific effects in order to avoid endogeneity owing 
to the correlation between the lagged outcome variable and country-specific effects. These 
country-specific studies are worthwhile for targeted policy implications, in the light of some 
attendant country-specific studies in the literature (Begum et al., 2015;  Bölük & Mehmet, 
2015).  
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6. List of Abbreviations  
CO2 emissions: Carbon dioxide emissions 
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product  
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa  
EKC: Environmental Kuznets Curve 
MEAs: Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
GMM: Generalised Method of Moments 
DHT: Difference in Hansen Test 
IV: Instrumental Variable 
OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions 
WDI: World Development Indicators  
WGI: World Governance Indicators  
PCA: Principal Component Analysis 
PS: Political Stability 
VA: Voice and Accountability 
Polgov: Political Governance  
GE: Government Effectiveness  
RQ: Regulation Quality  
Ecogov: Economic Governance  
RL: Rule of Law 
CC: Corruption-Control 
Instgov: Institutional Governance  
Ggov: General Governance  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurements) Sources 
    
CO2 per capita CO2mtpc CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political Stability  
 PS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
 
 
  
Voice & 
Accountability  
VA “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Political Governance  Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
PCA 
    
Government 
Effectiveness 
GE “Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Regulation  Quality  RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
 
 
  
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
 
 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
 
Corruption-Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov “First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them” 
PCA 
 
   
General Governance  Ggov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Educational Quality Educ Pupil teacher ratio in Primary Education  World Bank (WDI) 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  WGI: World Governance Indicators. PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
CO2 per capita 0.911 1.842 0.016 10.093 532 
Political Stability  -0.486 0.923 -2.660 1.192 496 
Voice & Accountability  -0.543 0.687 -1.838 0.986 496 
Political Governance  0.140 1.230 -2.653 2.583 496 
Government Effectiveness  -0.697 0.584 -1.960 0.934 496 
Regulation Quality  -0.604 0.542 -2.110 0.983 496 
Economic Governance   0.205 1.225 -2.288 3.807 496 
Rule of Law -0.663 0.614 -2.113 1.056 496 
Corruption-Control -0.590 0.565 -1.566 1.249 496 
Institutional Governance   0.144 1.282 -2.391 3.766 496 
General Governance  0.284 2.040 -4.567 5.561 496 
GDP growth  4.801 5.054 -32.832 33.735 530 
Population growth  2.335 0.876 -1.081 6.576 495 
Educational Quality  43.892 14.775 12.466 100.236 397 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 351) 
               
 Governance Dynamics Control variables  Dependent 
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance     Variable 
 PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov RL CC Instgov G.gov GDPg Popg Educ CO2mtpc 
PS 1.000              
VA 0.711 1.000             
Polgov 0.927 0.923 1.000            
GE 0.677 0.759 0.775 1.000           
RQ 0.627 0.702 0.717 0.883 1.000          
Ecogov 0.637 0.754 0.771 0.974 0.966 1.000         
RL 0.814 0.826 0.886 0.891 0.829 0.888 1.000        
CC 0.719 0.717 0.776 0.858 0.776 0.844 0.867 1.000       
Instgov 0.792 0.798 0.859 0.905 0.830 0.896 0.965 0.967 1.000      
G.gov 0.838 0.871 0.923 0.937 0.886 0.941 0.967 0.914 0.973 1.000     
GDPg -0.093 -0.007 -0.054 -0.001 -0.079 -0.038 -0.046 -0.063 -0.056 -0.052 1.000    
Popg -0.333 -0.265 -0.323 -0.406 -0.280 -0.358 -0.376 -0.447 -0.426 -0.392 0.203 1.000   
Educ -0.355 -0.399 -0.407 -0.395 -0.307 -0.365 -0.417 -0.422 -0.434 -0.425 0.114 0.437 1.000  
CO2mtpc 0.311 0.413 0.391 0.553 0.399 0.496 0.436 0.493 0.481 0.484 -0.078 -0.536 -0.444 1.000 
               
“PS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: 
Economic Governance. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Corruption-Control. Instgov: Institutional Governance. Ggov: General Governance. GDP: Gross 
Domestic Product growth. Popg: Population growth. Educ: Education quality. CO2mtpc: CO2 emissions per capita”.  
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